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This paper investigated the impact of investment in soil and water conservation strategies and tenure 
security on household welfare in Kenya. The paper used survey data collected from a sample of about 
450 households in 2004. The paper estimated reduced form models to test the hypothesis that 
investments in soil and water conservation affect household welfare. The results showed that strong 
land rights are directly related to household welfare when welfare is measured through livestock wealth 
but not when measured through expenditures and incomes. We also found that the number of 
conservation structures in place and the willingness to invest are important determinants of household 
welfare. Further, presence and membership in village institutions, soil quality and topography are 
important determinants of household welfare. The impact of soil and water conservation as well as 
agro-ecological potential on household welfare suggests the existence of a poverty-environment link. 
The results call for policies that improve environmental conservation and strengthen land tenure 
security in order to alleviate household poverty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty in Kenya is most severe in rural areas where an 
estimated 65% of the population reside, deriving their 
livelihood from the natural resource base. Agriculture 
remains the main source of livelihood. One of the most 
important features of Kenyan agriculture is the large 
subsistence sector, which makes agriculture even more 
important for food security. However, over the last three 
decades, soil erosion and land degradation have become 
major environmental concerns and present a formidable 
threat to food security and sustainability of agricultural 
production. The proximate causes of land degradation 
are numerous and militate against the ongoing efforts at 
poverty alleviation. Efforts at poverty alleviation have 
failed to bring adequate progress and development 
despite decades of development assistance. Growing 
population, in combination with  poor  initial  resource  en- 
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dowments, and macro-economic policies biased against 
agriculture have not only failed to alleviate poverty, but 
also led to a deterioration of the natural resource base on 
which rural livelihoods depend. 
It is generally accepted that development hinges on the 
dimensions of ecological sustainability, economic 
feasibility and social acceptance. However, a number of 
critical dimensions in the development context are 
unfavorable, yet they constitute the main issues related to 
sustainable development. These development domain 
dimensions include agro-ecological potential, population 
density, market access and institutional setting. Less-
favored areas are typically characterized by a com-
bination of low agricultural potential and/or poor market 
access; often existing in an institutional setting that is not 
conducive to alternative viable development pathways 
(Pender et al., 1999). Agricultural potential is low due to 
agro-climatic conditions and the quantity and quality of 
the natural resource base. Poor market access is related 
to the relative isolation of an area and  is  often  linked  to  
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poor physical infrastructure. High population density 
depends critically on the carrying capacity of the land 
since in many parts of Africa this is reached at low levels 
of population in absolute terms. The institutional setting 
refers to the set of rules governing natural resources and 
their use. Although land tenure can be hypothesized to 
play an important role, it is not the only factor, and is 
often subordinate to market access and relative resource 
endowments in general (Bruce et al., 1994). Soil and 
water conservation (SWC) investments cannot also be 
seen in isolation from development domain dimensions 
that frame the livelihood strategies of households in a 
specific area. 
There is a no easy solution for the complex situation of 
less-favored areas. To improve the lot of the poor, there 
is need for a combination of appropriate technology, an 
institutional setting that helps households to cope with 
existing market and government failures, and a set of 
policy measures that induce behavior leading to both 
higher levels of household welfare and improved 
management of the natural resource base (World Bank, 
1997). 
Previous research concurs that poverty; agricultural 
stagnation and resource degradation are interlinked. The 
literature has shown that natural resource degradation 
contributes to declining agricultural productivity and 
reduced livelihoods options, while poverty and food 
insecurity in turn contribute to worsening resource 
degradation by households (see Kabubo-Mariara et al., 
2006 for a review of the poverty-environment literature). 
Livelihoods in many resource poor farming and pastoral 
systems have been sustained by land use practices that 
have tended to perpetuate poverty, soil erosion and other 
land degradation phenomena. Available evidence further 
indicates that there are two overall aspects of poverty-
environment nexus at the rural household level both of 
which are critical to a better understanding of the land 
degradation process in developing countries (Barbier, 
1999). First, poverty is not a direct cause of land degra-
dation, but is a constraining factor on rural households’ 
ability to avoid land degradation or to invest in mitigating 
strategies. Second, poor households are unable to 
compete for resources, including high-quality and 
productive land, such that they are often confined to 
unproductive areas, a situation that further perpetuates 
poverty. There are also both exogenous and endogenous 
factors whose feedback effects lead to a vicious circle of 
low productivity, poverty and land degradation (Shiferaw 
and Holden, 2001; Barbier, 1999; Reardon and Vosti, 
1995; World Bank, 1997). 
In Kenya, conservation and sustainable utilization of 
the environment and natural resources now form an 
integral part of national planning and poverty reduction 
efforts. The Economic Recovery Strategy Paper (ERS) 
recognizes that weak environmental management, unsu-
stainable land use practices and depletion of the natural 
resource base have resulted in severe land degradation. 
This seriously impedes increases  in  agricultural  produc- 
 
 
 
 
tivity and must be addressed in order to check its adverse 
impact on poverty. This study examines some of the ERS 
concerns on conservation, sustainable utilization and 
management of the environment and natural resources 
and attempts to fill in research and policy gaps identified 
by the ERS. It aims at gaining insights in tenure security 
issues, providing guidelines for poverty reducing land 
conservation practices. 
The present study builds on earlier works on the 
poverty-environment nexus in Kenya (see Tiffen et al., 
1994; Kabubo-Mariara, 2004, 2005; Kabubo-Mariara, 
Mwabu and Kimuyu, 2006). The study contributes to the 
literature by analyzing the impact of tenure security, soil 
and water conservation investments and development 
domain dimensions on household welfare in Kenya. The 
study focuses on both income and non-income measures 
of poverty, analyzing the direct and indirect impacts of all 
exogenous variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
two presents the study site and the data. Section three 
presents the conceptual framework and methodology, 
section four presents the results and section five 
concludes. 
 
 
THE STUDY SITE AND THE DATA  
 
This study is based on data collected from a sample of 
457 households in November and December, 2004. The 
National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme 
(NASSEP1) IV of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry 
of Planning and National Development was used as the 
sampling frame for the field survey. The sample survey 
utilized a multi-stage sample design. A mixture of 
purposive stratified and random sampling methods were 
employed to arrive at the final sample. 
The first stage in the sampling procedure involved 
selecting study districts, based on differences in poverty, 
population density, terrain and tenure security issues. 
The second stage involved selecting administrative 
divisions within each of the three districts, based on agro-
ecological diversity. The third stage involved selection of 
locations and sub-locations, which were also based on 
agro-ecological diversity. The fourth stage involved 
selection of sample points (clusters) from the NASSEP 
frame, which was based on the total number of clusters 
within a sub location and the number of households in 
each cluster.  In the final stage, the desired number of 
households was selected from each cluster. To arrive at 
the total number of households actually visited, we took a 
self weighting probability sample from  each  cluster  in  a 
                                                 
1
 The NASSEP frame has a two-stage stratified cluster design for the 
whole country. First, enumeration areas are selected using the national 
census records, with the probability proportional to size of expected 
clusters. The number of expected clusters is obtained by dividing each 
primary sampling unit into 100 households. The clusters are then selected 
randomly and all the households enumerated. 
  
 
 
district making a total of 457 households from the three 
districts (151, 188 and 151 from Murang’a, Maragua and 
Narok districts respectively). In addition to the household 
survey, a community questionnaire was administered to 
selected key informants in each cluster (village). The 
village survey collected information on product and input 
prices, market access and village infrastructure and was 
meant to supplement information collected from house-
holds. Full details on sampling, data and all descriptive 
statistics are presented in Kabubo-Mariara et al. (2006).  
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The impact of tenure security and investment in soil and water 
conservation is based on the agricultural household model. The 
model, assumes that households engage in activities using their 
scarce resources in order to attain their goals and aspirations taking 
into account that they are constrained by external environmental 
and socio-economic circumstances. The model can be summarized 
in a number of basic equations that are a slight expansion of the 
original model (Singh et al., 1986).  The first equation is the utility 
function where u denotes utility and c a vector of consumption 
goods and l denotes leisure, ξ denotes household characteristics, 
Fn denotes the cumulative distribution function of states of nature 
that captures the inherent risk and uncertainty of rural livelihood 
systems in terms of prices, weather and in some cases tenure (see 
for instance Kruseman, 2000; 2001). The inclusion of SWC 
technology implies a longer time horizon which requires the 
inclusion of a subjective time preference as discount rate r 
comparable to the general formulation of optimal control models 
(Bulte and van Soest, 1999). Suppressing as in all following 
equations time and nature subscripts, the utility function is: 
 
( , , ) rtc l e dtdFµ µ ξ −=                                  (1) 
 
Utility is maximized subject to a cash income constraint where cm 
and ca are vectors of market purchased and household produced 
consumption commodities, q is a vector of commodities produced 
by the household, pm and pa are vectors of market and farm-gate 
commodity prices respectively, pb is a vector of input prices related 
to material inputs x, w i and w o are vectors of factor prices 
(including wage rates and land rents) for hiring in or renting out 
production factors (f i and f o respectively), and y* is exogenous 
income: 
 
( ) *m m a a b i i o op c p q c p x w f w f y= − − − + +            (2) 
 
The household faces a set of resource constraints that specify that 
the household cannot allocate more resources to activities than is 
available in terms of total stock f T: 
 
factors allfor Tao fff ≤+                    (3) 
 
For labour there is an additional component of leisure which can be 
expressed as: 
 
T
L
a
L
o
L flff =++                                                      (3a) 
 
The household faces a production constraint reflected by a 
technology function that depicts the relationship between inputs (x, 
fi, fa)  and  outputs  (q)  conditional  on  farm  characteristics  ζ ,  soil  
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quality s and technology level τ : 
 
( , , , , )i aq q x f f sζ τ= +                                           (4) 
 
Solving the agricultural household model can be done in a number 
of ways: the first is to estimate the full structure of the model, by 
estimating each equation separately and then using the quantified 
model to simulate responses as commonly done in bio-economic 
modeling (Kruseman, 2000). 
The alternative is to estimate reduced form equations of the 
household model. Using reduced form equations is traditionally 
considered the most appropriate way of dealing with these types of 
complexities. The coefficients in the reduced form equations 
capture the sum of both direct and indirect effects. Because of this 
characteristic it is imperative to include all relevant explanatory 
variables in the analysis, even if their coefficients are insignificant 
for the analysis being undertaken. This approach however deserves 
some attention. If we derive the first-order conditions for the agri-
cultural household model and meticulously combine and collapse 
the resulting equations the end result is a system of equations 
where the dependent variables consist of the choice variables of 
the household (production structure, investment, consumption, 
resource allocation) and on the right-hand side all the exogenous 
factors (household characteristics, farm characteristics, institutional 
characteristics). However, we have to be very careful about 
causality and attribution in the inter-temporal context. 
The equations that capture these decision processes include 
quasi-fixed inputs and determinants of wealth. The problem is 
however, that past decisions that lead to current wealth and already 
available SWC structures are based, in principle, on the same set of 
independent variables. Total cumulative investment and wealth are 
part of a set of inter-temporal dependent variables. This inter-
temporal aspect is something that is often not fully taken into 
account. 
Standard farm household theory, however, postulates that farm 
households in developing countries often show behaviour that 
indicates that consumption and production decisions are non-
separable. The difficulty of estimating the underlying structural 
relationships and the complexity of the interacting components of 
the farm household, and the problem of unobservable or non mea-
surable key variables, imply that there are serious consequences 
for econometric estimation of empirical models (Kruseman, 2001). 
In addition to the farm household, household welfare analysis is 
also founded on the standard economic theory of consumer 
behaviour (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Glewwe, 1991). Because 
household welfare is unobservable, consumption expenditure can 
be used as a proxy for welfare. The expenditure variable can 
however be scaled down as desired to take into consideration 
differences such as household size, so that the dependent variable 
collapses into per capita rather than absolute expenditure. This 
allows for comparison of welfare levels across households with 
different composition and across regions with different prices. 
To explain household welfare, we can therefore estimate a 
reduced form model of per capita expenditure or income combining 
all the various structural relationships, which affect welfare. For 
policy analysis it is important to include variables influenced by 
government actions. We therefore include a vector of standard 
explanatory variables (Glewwe, 1991). These include household 
characteristics, farm characteristics and institutional variables. 
Using the survey data we examine the correlation that exists 
between welfare, resource conservation, land tenure security and 
land quality. To find out if there is a relationship between the 
endogenous variables related to welfare and resource conservation 
beyond the relationship between the exogenous variables that 
determine both issues, we use analysis of the regression model re-
siduals. The residuals enter into the final model as error correction 
terms (ECM) and  eliminate  any  bias  that  could  arise  from  inter- 
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relationship between these endogenous variables and welfare. The 
basic model that we want to estimate is a generalized reduced form 
equation expressed as: 
 
Y = f(ζ,ξ,υ ) +                                                                          (5) 
 
Where; Y is per capita expenditure or any other measure of welfare, 
 is a vector of farm characteristics, including land tenure arrange-
ments surrounding the arable land and the asset base of the 
household,  is a vector of household characteristics and υ is a 
vector of village characteristics, including development domain 
dimensions and quantifiable institutional arrangements at village 
level. The regression coefficients capture the direct and indirect 
effects of the truly independent variables on household choice 
variables. Our deviation from standard poverty analysis is to 
introduce institutional factors and SWC investment variables into 
the welfare model. The institutional factors such as the presence of 
special interest groups and extension agencies, and the choice of 
SWC investments are (partly) endogenous determinants and have 
to be explained themselves. In particular, the presence of interest 
groups and the willingness to listen to extension agents affect the 
willingness to invest. In order to disentangle partly endogenous 
effects we use a step-wise estimation approach. 
Institutional factors are indicators of how well households/villages 
organize themselves to enhance household welfare. To capture the 
impact of the membership of the household in special interest 
groups/village institutions, we use the following model. 
 
igrpmigrpm
vfp
__
),,( εξζ +=                                      (6)  
 
We specify equation (6) for three (i=3) different interest groups: 
membership in income generating groups, loans groups and 
benevolent groups. By definition, the expected probability for 
membership if there is no organization present is zero.  We 
therefore estimate a series of probit models on membership based 
on equation (6). 
In addition, we are interested in analyzing the impact of extension 
services on household welfare. However, we do not have direct 
information on the presence of natural resource management 
(NRM) extension possibilities at village level. What we do have is 
information on whether households use extension for a variety of 
purposes. Even though we have information on specific NRM 
extension, information may have been supplied through other 
extension sources without the household realizing this. 
The expected willingness to listen to extension services pex_yn is 
estimated with a probit model. 
 
ynexynex vfp __ ),,( εξζ +=                                                  (7) 
 
The willingness to listen to extension in NRM, pex_NRM, is also a 
probit model, which can be specified as: 
 
NRMexNRMex vfp __ ),,( εξζ +=                                          8)   
 
The willingness to invest in NRM at household level depends on 
household, farm and village characteristics. The willingness to 
invest is taken for investments made up to five years ago. If the 
household made no investments in the past 5 years the investment 
is set to zero. Past investments ( EvNRMξδ ) are SWC investments 
made more than 5 years ago. Next to the common determinant, the 
willingness to invest depends on the willingness to listen to NRM 
extension, and the willingness to listen to extension in general as 
well as the awareness of the presence and membership of NRM 
and other special interest groups. However, since these variables 
are endogenous, we need to apply a nested  methodology  for  cap- 
 
 
 
 
turing these variables. We can then use the residual terms of each 
of the equations (membership in each of the three interest groups, 
probability of listening to extension services and probability of 
listening to extension in NRM) as explanatory variables in the 
willingness to invest equation. The reason for using these residual 
terms for estimating the endogenous variables is that the terms are 
orthogonal to the other independent variables in the equation at 
hand2. The truly independent variables still capture both the direct 
and indirect effects, while the residual terms capture the effect of 
the endogenous variable.  
The willingness to invest at household level then becomes: 
 
hhIEvNRMNRMexynexgrpimhhI pppvfp ___,__ ),,,,,( εδξζ ξεεε +=  (9) 
 
Where the superscript  over a variable denotes that the variable is 
a residual. However, we note that the equations deriving the 
residuals are a set of identical equations. In principal membership 
in special interest groups and willingness to listen to extension 
services (including extension in NRM) are related and therefore we 
should correct for correlation of variances. However methods such 
as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) cannot be applied with 
probit models. We can however find a common variance factor by 
applying a factor analysis on the residuals of each of the probit 
results of each of the equations. Since all observations are present 
in all equations and the set of exogenous explanatory variables of 
each model is identical, the residuals are uncorrelated with the set 
of explanatory variables. The un-rotated factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0 provide us with a measure of common variance. 
This can be included in the final estimation model of the willingness 
to invest in SWC. In the empirical analysis, the factor analysis loads 
on two factors, willingness to listen to extension in general and 
membership in special interest groups in general3. These two 
factors are then used in the final estimating model of the willingness 
to invest at the household level. Equation (9) therefore becomes: 
 
hhgrpmexthhI vfp ___ ),,,,( ϕεϕϕξζ +=          (10) 
 
To capture the effect of membership in interest groups, willingness 
to listen to extension and the willingness to invest in SWC on 
household welfare, we enter the residual terms of equations (6, 7 
and 10) into the welfare equation (5). This way we are able to 
capture the direct and indirect effects of both the exogenous and 
potentially endogenous variables. The final estimating welfare 
equation becomes: 
 
yhhIynexgrpim pppvfY εξζ εεε += ),,,,( __,_   (11) 
 
Where; ε hhIp _  is the residual of the willingness to invest in soil and 
water conservation (predicted from equation 11). 
 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we present a brief  description  of  the  key
                                                 
2Note that the predicted residuals are not necessarily independent from the 
error term of the equation in which the endogenous variable appears as 
explanatory variable. Particularly, if they are dependent this estimation 
approach will yield biased estimators, although the bias will be small. 
3
 The results of the stepwise regression and factor analysis are not 
presented in this paper to save on space, but are available from the authors 
on request. 
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Table 1. Household characteristics. 
 
Variable 
Full sample 
Mean Std. dev. 
Female head dummy (1 = female) 0.17 0.37 
Age of household head 50.23 15.41 
Minority tribe dummy (Maasai =1) 0.19 0.39 
Household head’s years of schooling 6.50 4.16 
Household’s maximum years of schooling  9.33 3.44 
Head is employed/business 0.23 0.42 
Number of children 0 to 5 years 0.66 0.90 
Number of children 6 to 16 years  1.68 1.57 
Number of adult women in household 1.32 0.73 
Number of adult males in household 1.29 0.91 
Household size 5.44 2.59 
Monthly per capita expenditure (Kshs.) 882.2 628.5 
Current value of livestock  ('000) 14.49 21.73 
Value of livestock previous year ('000) 13.49 20.93 
Value of equipment previous year ('000) 7.97 12.53 
Total  acreage (farm size) 7.22 19.51 
Number of observations 457 
 
 
 
variables utilized in the empirical analysis. The distri-
bution of household characteristics is presented in Table 
1. The variables presented in the table are observed at 
the household level. Where appropriate, plot level 
variables are also used but weighted by the number of 
plots to obtain the household level averages. These 
variables include tenure security factors, investment in 
soil and water conservation strategies (SWC) and soil 
quality. Due to limitations of space, we briefly discuss the 
key variables of interest.  
 
 
Tenure security 
 
To capture all aspects of tenure security, this study 
collected data on both the mode of acquisition and 
expected land rights. The data shows that 71% of the 
plots were owned (and often used) by the household, 
22% of the plots were rented in, and 7% of the plots were 
rented out. More than half of the plots were inherited, and 
the duration of ownership was more than 18 years on 
average. In addition, 5% of the plots had been in the 
household’s ownership for more than 50 years. In 46% of 
the cases the plots were registered to the household 
management team (head or spouse) while 31% of the 
plots were registered to other relatives. 
Including all aspects of tenure security in the empirical 
analysis would however be cumbersome because the 
choice of specific indicators is more or less arbitrary. To 
avoid such arbitrariness we used factor analysis (FA) at 
the plot level to filter out the key elements of tenure 
security out of a wide range of tenure security variables. 
This limited the number of tenure security variables in our  
analysis to retain only the key elements. From the factor 
analysis, only five factors were constructed. The first 
variable was own farmland (registered in head of house-
hold or spouse) ranging from full ownership to indefinite 
rental arrangements. The second factor reflected plots 
owned by the extended family (father or mother of 
head/spouse). The third factor was plots (land for sale) 
for which other relatives have to give permission for 
selling or bequeath, and the fourth factor covered rented 
out land. The final factor reflected rental conditions of 
plots that were either rented or lent with or without 
permission. 
 
 
Investment in soil and water conservation (SWC) 
 
For investment in soil and water conservation, the study 
collected data on the type of improvements, the number 
of SWC structures, when the improvement was elected 
and whether or not any SWC strategy had been 
abandoned. Tree planting was the most common form of 
land improvements in all the districts. This was followed 
by terracing with grass strips and grass strips alone. For 
purposes of explaining household welfare, the willingness 
 to invest in SWC, the number of SWC structures, and 
the past SWC strategies were investigated. The data 
shows that 70% of all households were willing to take up 
SWC strategies, while every household had at least one 
SWC strategy in place and one previous SWC strategies.  
 
 
Soil quality 
 
Soil quality and topographical factors were  also  constructed 
046         J. Dev. Agric. Econ. 
 
 
 
using factor analysis. The data on soil quality on all plots 
included type, workability, texture, depth of soil, as well 
as the perceptions regarding fertility of the soil. Except for 
depth of soil, all categories of soil quality variables were 
retained in the factor analysis and were therefore used as 
explanatory variables for welfare. Topography was 
measured through the terrain (whether sloped, flat or 
undulating). Three topographical factors were obtained 
from the factor analysis: flatness, moderate slope and 
undulating terrain. 
 
 
Village characteristics 
 
Village level variables were also determined using factor 
analysis. Market access was based on information on 
distance, mode, travel time and expenses from the village 
to particular destinations like markets and roads amongst 
others collected using a community questionnaire. For 
institutional variables, data was collected on type (village, 
men’s groups, women groups and other) and purpose of 
organization (loans, benevolent, incomes and other 
village groups including natural resource management). 
In addition to the type and purpose, we counted the 
number of institutions in each of the villages and applied 
factor analysis to shed light on the issue. Five factors 
were retained as key institutional factors, explaining 96% 
of variance in the factor loadings. These included the 
number of institutions present in each village, men’s 
groups, household investment and income generation 
groups, village groups and safety nets and natural 
resource management investment groups. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section we present the regression results linking 
household welfare, tenure security and investment in 
water and soil conservation. To explain household wel-
fare empirically, we use both the expenditure and income 
approaches to poverty on one hand and asset approach 
(livestock) on the other. We specify per capita values of 
these measures as a function of household, farm and 
village level characteristics including development 
domain dimensions and quantifiable institutional arrange-
ments at village level as specified in equation (11) in the 
conceptual framework and methodology section. 
Household characteristics include gender and age of the 
household head, household composition and years of 
schooling of the household head. Farm characteristics 
are primarily related to the production factors: land, 
labour, capital and knowledge. Land is defined as the 
interplay of plot area, soil, topography, and the insti-
tutional arrangements in terms of quantity and quality. In 
addition, investment in environmental conservation has 
an important bearing on land quality. Village charac-
teristics consist of socio-economic conditions, institutional 
aspects and ecological potential proxied by district dummies. 
 
 
 
 
District dummies also capture the impact of other 
unaccounted for factors such as agro-ecological zones 
and climate which differ across districts. This controls for 
the community fixed effects, eliminating any bias from 
unobserved community level heterogeneity, provided 
such heterogeneity enters the welfare function linearly.  
Market access, population density and village institutions 
are the key village variables utilized in the empirical 
analysis. 
 
 
Determinants of per capita expenditures and incomes 
 
The results for per capita expenditure and incomes are 
presented in Table 2. A quick overall picture shows that 
vector of determinants used to explain welfare have a 
significant joint impact on per capita expenditure and 
incomes. In particular, the models fit the data better than 
the intercept only model at all levels of significance as 
shown by the F statistic. In addition, the variables explain 
33% of the total variation in per capita expenditure but 
only 24% of the total variation in per capita income. Since 
expenditure is argued to be a better measure of welfare 
than incomes, we base the discussion on the per capita 
expenditure function. However, a quick overview indi-
cates that some variables differ in their impact on the two 
measures of welfare, in terms of the magnitude, signs 
and significance of the coefficients. 
The results show that household characteristics are 
important correlates of welfare.  The dummy for female 
heads of households show that female headed house-
holds are poorer than male headed household. Though 
this is consistent with studies on poverty in Kenya, the 
impact is insignificant. Age of the household head exhi-
bits a U shape relationship with expenditure per capita 
implying that household welfare declines with the age of 
the household but after some age starts to increase. This 
point at family life cycle effects on welfare. Young 
households may not accumulate wealth in the formative 
years due to increased expenditure to cater for a growing 
family. After some threshold, the households are able to 
diversify their income base and even to save and thus 
increase per capita expenditure. The coefficient for age 
squared is not statistically different from zero. 
Family composition variables are included to capture 
differential impact of different gender-age groups on 
household consumption. The gender-age categories of 
interest are number of children up to 5 years, number of 
children 6 to 16 years and number of adult males and 
females. Except for number of adult males, all the house-
hold composition variables are negative and statistically 
significant implying that larger households are worse off 
than smaller households. We uncover no impact of 
education of household head on welfare. Household cha-
racteristics are jointly significant at all conventional levels 
of testing {F(9,409) = 8.26}. 
Other characteristics of interest are household assets 
(livestock and equipment ownership). Because these  two 
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Table 2. Reduced form estimates of household welfare:  per capita expenditure and income. 
 
Variable 
Per capita expenditure Per capita income 
Household characteristics and assets 
Female head -0.0563 0.1573 
 [0.52] [0.49] 
Age of household head -0.0363 -0.048 
 [1.93]* [1.19] 
Age of household head squared 0.0002 0.0003 
 [1.48] [1.08] 
child less than 5 years old in a household -0.1133 0.2207 
 [2.52]** [1.90]* 
children 6 to 16 years old in a household -0.0771 -0.0628 
 [2.17]** [0.67] 
number of adult women in a household -0.1654 -0.1085 
 [3.40]*** [0.78] 
Number of adult men in a household 0.0637 0.2581 
 [0.75] [0.96] 
Household head years of schooling -0.0008 -0.0034 
 [0.06] [0.09] 
Masaai tribe dummy 2.1198 2.3465 
 [2.09]** [0.81] 
Lagged value of livestock (log)  0.1461 0.1761 
 [2.68]*** [1.05] 
Lagged value of farm equipment (log) 0.1534 0.6226 
 [3.26]*** [4.23]*** 
   
Investment in SWC   
Number of SWC structures on farm 0.1951 0.1818 
 [4.16]*** [1.38] 
   
Soil quality and topography   
Fine texture  0.0189 0.0144 
 [0.71] [0.16] 
Coarse soils -0.1082 0.1706 
 [2.91]*** [1.90]* 
Workability 0.0706 -0.0088 
 [2.91]*** [0.13] 
Red vs. black soils 0.058 -0.2041 
 [1.79]* [2.02]** 
Fertility -0.0007 0.1128 
 [0.02] [1.50] 
Very fertile soils -0.035 0.0161 
 [1.25] [0.18] 
Poor soils 0.09 0.3971 
 [1.42] [1.86]* 
Unknown quality -0.0263 -0.0307 
 [1.14] [0.54] 
Moderate slope -0.0076 0.0458 
 [0.34] [0.63] 
Flatness of slope -0.002 -0.1641 
 [0.09] [1.81]* 
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Undulating terrain  -0.0776 -0.0578 
 [3.14]*** [0.96] 
   
Tenure security and related factors   
Land registered in household head or spouse -0.0704 -0.281 
 [1.68]* [2.20]** 
Family land (registered in extended family) 0.0456 0.114 
 [1.34] [1.17] 
Right to sell family land with permission -0.1368 -0.122 
 [3.44]*** [0.99] 
Rented out land -0.0455 -0.2714 
 [0.63] [1.11] 
Lent out land 0.0043 0.0293 
 [0.21] [0.44] 
Plot area (farm size) -0.0587 0.0647 
 [2.29]** [0.76] 
Distance to plot -0.0044 -0.0022 
 [2.82]*** [0.45] 
   
Village characteristics   
Number of institutions present -0.2077 0.3957 
 [0.86] [0.50] 
Presence of men’s groups 0.095 -0.1454 
 [1.47] [0.83] 
Presence of income generating groups -0.557 -0.5268 
 [2.27]** [0.73] 
Presence of village committees/groups 0.4025 1.2383 
 [1.45] [1.37] 
Presence of safety net and NRM groups 0.3363 0.2107 
 [1.44] [0.28] 
Population density -0.0016 -0.0022 
 [3.54]*** [1.42] 
Market access -1.0539 -2.1673 
 [2.02]** [1.46] 
Murang’a district dummy -0.2965 -0.9338 
 [1.85]* [2.16]** 
Narok district dummy -4.4717 -4.3405 
 [2.46]** [0.82] 
   
Error correction terms (residuals)   
Listened to extension services 0.1316 -0.0531 
 [1.85]* [0.23] 
Membership in income generating groups 0.1933 0.52 
 [1.57] [1.35] 
Membership in loans generating groups 0.0222 0.382 
Membership in benevolent groups 0.1988 -0.1932 
 [2.20]** [0.64] 
Willingness to invest in SWC -0.1411 -0.3127 
 [1.77]* [1.67]* 
 [0.32] [2.03]** 
Constant 5.7948 8.0008 
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 [6.83]*** [3.50]*** 
Observations 454 454 
R-squared 0.33 0.25 
F(44, 409) 4.62*** 3.38 
 
Robust t statistics in brackets. 
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
variables are potentially endogenous, we use previous 
(lagged) endowments of livestock and equipment as 
determinants of welfare. Both variables are positive and 
significant correlates of welfare. The results show that 
household assets are welfare improving. 
The impact of investment in soil and water conservation 
is captured by two variables: the number of SWC 
investment structures present per plot4 and a residual for 
the willingness to invest in SWC. The results show that 
the total number of SWC investments on land used by a 
household has a large positive and significant impact on 
household welfare, implying a poverty environment link. 
However, we do not uncover any important impact of the 
willingness to invest in SWC on household welfare. The 
interpretation is that it is the actual investments made 
rather than the willingness to invest that matters for 
welfare. The SWC variables are jointly significant deter-
minants of welfare at all conventional levels of testing 
{F(2, 409) = 9.87}, further supporting existence of a 
poverty-environment link. 
We investigate the impact of two different categories of 
farm characteristics: soil quality and topography, both 
indicators of development domain dimensions. In addi-
tion, we include acreage and distance to plot. For soil 
quality, we investigate the impact of the workability of 
soil, colour of the soil (red vs. black), and texture. For 
topography, we investigate the impact of the nature of 
terrain and slope. The results indicate that soils with easy 
workability are positively correlated with household wel-
fare, but coarse soils exhibit an inverse relationship with 
welfare. Relative to black soils, red soils have a 
significant positive impact on welfare. The implication of 
these results is that households with better quality soils 
will increase availability of food/income through higher 
crop productivity. We find that undulating land is inversely 
and significantly correlated with household welfare.  This 
is because such land is more prone to soil erosion than 
flat land. Acreage has a negative and significant co-
efficient, implying that controlling for other factors; more 
land may not be an important determinant of welfare. 
Though this result may be surprising, a further look at the 
data shows that high acreage of land is among house-
holds located  in  less  favourable  agro-ecological  zones 
                                                 
4
 The number of SWC investment structures include all SWC investments 
that have been present since one year and which have not been abandoned. 
Thus, actual SWC investments made in the current year are excluded. 
zones and therefore the productivity of their land is likely 
to be much lower than for households with low acreage. 
Distance to plot exhibits a negative and significant impact 
on welfare. This can be explained by the fact that time 
wasted in moving to distant plots results to lower farm 
productivity and incomes, which translate into poverty. All 
different groups of farm characteristics pass the joint 
significance test, suggesting the importance of farm 
characteristics and therefore development domain 
dimensions in household welfare. 
For tenure security, we use five variables constructed 
using factor analysis to capture tenure security. The first 
variable captures owned plots (which are often inherited), 
which have been owned by the family for a long period of 
time and which can be sold without permission. The 
second variable captures family land that can be sold or 
bequeathed without permission or with permission. The 
other variables include land registered in family name, 
rented out and the right to rent out land without per-
mission. Farmland and plots whose ownership is vested 
in relatives are negatively and significantly correlated with 
welfare. The impact of tenure security is counter-intuitive 
because when interpreted from the factor loadings, the 
negative coefficient suggests that land perceived to 
belong to the family is inversely related to welfare, while 
indefinite rental arrangements would positively impact of 
welfare. Taking together the impact of farmland and plots 
owned by relatives, the results imply that land rights 
based on inherited land are inversely related with income. 
Thus we do not uncover the expected impact of tenure 
security on household welfare when welfare is measured 
though expenditures and incomes. This is probably due 
to inclusion of both direct and indirect effects of all 
endogenous variables in the model. 
Village characteristics are captured by a vector of 
variables, which are measures of institutional presence. 
The variables include the number of village institutions 
present, presence of men’s groups, income generation, 
village committees and safety net and natural resource 
management institutions. Presence of village based 
institutions alone does not seem to matter for poverty 
reduction. For instance, presence of income generating 
groups is inversely related to expenditures, while all other 
institutional factors have insignificant coefficients. 
However, membership in village institutions is positively 
correlated to income as shown by the error correction 
terms  (ECM).  Membership  in  benevolent  and   income  
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generation groups is positively and significantly related to 
expenditure, confirming the importance of institutional 
factors in poverty reduction. Furthermore, the ECM var-
iables are jointly significant at the 5% level of significance 
{F(3,409) = 2.45}. Households that listened to land 
conservation extension services are also less poor than 
their counterparts who never listened. 
We also investigate the impact of population density 
and market access. Population density is inversely rela-
ted to expenditure, implying that poverty is concentrated 
in regions of high population density. Market access has 
the unexpected negative and significant sign, making it 
difficult to explain.  The expected correlation between po-
pulation density and market access and also the testing 
of both direct and indirect effects probably explain these 
results. The significance of population density shows the 
importance of development domain dimensions in 
poverty alleviation. 
The two district dummies included in the model 
(Murang’a and Narok), in reference to Maragua district 
exhibit negative and significant coefficients implying that 
households located in Murang’a and Narok are likely to 
be poorer than households located in Maragua district. 
This result is not unexpected given the distribution of per 
capita expenditure across the three districts.  
 
 
Determinants of asset poverty 
 
Assets are a measure of the structural income of the 
household and vary in importance among households 
can therefore be good indicators of whether households 
(Barrett et al., 2006)5. Assets (and changes in assets) 
can therefore be good indicators of whether households 
suffer the risk of remaining poor or whether they are likely 
to move out of poverty. In addition, asset measures of 
poverty overcome the limitations of standard poverty 
measurement (such as being defined over the wrong 
space to measure economic policies directly and the 
difficulties of distinguishing between transitory and chro-
nic poverty even where panel data is available). An asset 
based approach therefore makes it easier to address the 
key questions surrounding household’s longer-term 
prospects of being non-poor (Carter and Barrett, 2006)6. 
In this paper, we use livestock wealth as a proxy for 
asset poverty.  This is because one of the districts of 
study has livestock production as a major economic 
activity. Income measures may therefore not be good 
indicators of the levels and  characteristics  of  poverty  in  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Structural approach to poverty alleviation is based on enhancing the 
returns that poor households earn on their household endowments (assets) 
and facilitating accumulation of productive assets (Carter and Barrett, 
2006).  
6
 See Carter and Barrett (2006) for detailed discussion on the value of 
asset-based approach to poverty measurement over other approaches. 
 
 
 
 
that district7. We model livestock wealth using the same 
determinants as the other measures of welfare. However, 
we use a two stage process to explain livestock wealth; 
first explaining livestock wealth a year prior to the survey. 
Previous livestock wealth is determined by the same 
characteristics that determine wealth today. This there-
fore means that there is a correlation between livestock 
now and livestock owned a year ago. To solve for this 
endogeneity, we need to use two stage least squares. In 
the first stage, we explain lagged livestock and predict 
residuals which we use to correct for the correlation 
between current wealth and previous wealth. Though the 
coefficients of variables do not change dramatically by 
including the residual of past wealth, this residual act as 
an error correction variable and the results are therefore 
more efficient than without this correction. The results for 
the second stage are presented in Table 3. The livestock 
wealth model fits the data better than the per capita ex-
penditure and income models, with the model explaining 
60% of the total variation in livestock wealth. 
The results suggest that household characteristics 
affect livestock wealth. Age exhibits an inverted U-
shaped relationship with livestock wealth implying life 
cycle effects of age on wealth. Consistent with the results 
for per capita expenditure and incomes, larger house-
holds are poorer than smaller households. We uncover 
no impact of female headship and number of adult 
females on livestock wealth. We uncover no important 
impact of the existing soil and water conservation assets 
on livestock wealth, but we find that the willingness to 
invest in soil and water conservation investments is a 
positive and significant determinant of livestock wealth. 
Other assets, namely education of the household head, 
equipment and the initial level of livestock wealth are 
positive and significant correlates of livestock wealth. 
Topography and soil quality factors also affect livestock 
wealth. Flat terrain is associated with higher livestock 
wealth. On the other hand, moderately sloped land, poor 
soils and general fertility of soil are inversely related to 
livestock wealth. Farm size and distance to plot do not 
seem to matter. Market access is a positive correlate of 
livestock wealth. Households in Narok are better off in 
livestock wealth terms than households in the other 
districts. 
Some aspects of land tenure are important determi-
nants of livestock wealth. In particular, land in the family 
rather than land titles has a positive impact on livestock 
wealth. However, rented land is inversely correlated with 
livestock wealth. Taken together, these two variables  im- 
 
                                                 
7
 Barrett et al. (2006) use a similar approach for herders in Northern 
Kenya, but use total livestock units rather than total value of livestock as 
in this paper. 
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Table 3. Reduced form estimates of household welfare:  livestock wealth. 
 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Household characteristics and assets   
Female head -0.185 -0.49 
Age of household head 0.144 3.55*** 
Age of household head squared -0.001 -3.04*** 
Child less than 5 years old in a household -0.178 -1.74* 
Children 6 to 16 years old in a household -0.277 -3.13*** 
Number of adult women in a household 0.144 1.11 
Number of adult men in a household -0.729 -3.10*** 
Household head years of schooling 0.108 4.01*** 
Masaai tribe dummy -5.685 -2.21** 
Lagged value of farm equipment (log) 0.272 1.76* 
   
Investment in SWC   
Number of SWC structures on farm -0.020 -0.18 
Soil quality & Topography   
Fine texture 0.068 0.97 
Coarse soils -0.035 -0.34 
Workability 0.048 0.64 
Red vs. black soils 0.111 1.16 
Fertility -0.128 -1.72* 
Very fertile soils 0.062 0.69 
Poor soils -0.307 -1.97** 
Unknown quality 0.106 2.08** 
Moderate slope -0.110 -1.73* 
Flatness of slope 0.127 1.92* 
Undulating terrain  -0.089 -1.48 
   
Tenure security and related factors   
Land registered in household head or spouse 0.049 0.46 
Land registered in extended family -0.124 -1.31 
Right to sell family land with permission 0.228 1.94** 
Rented out land 0.254 1.30 
Lent out land -0.163 -2.75*** 
Plot area (farm size) 0.113 1.23 
Distance to plot 0.005 1.16 
   
Village characteristics   
Number of institutions present -0.503 -0.75 
Presence of men’s groups -0.338 -2.17** 
Presence of income generating groups 1.706 2.39*** 
Presence of village committees/groups -1.721 -2.56*** 
Presence of safety net and NRM groups -0.274 -0.39 
Population density 0.001 0.74 
Market access 3.914 3.31*** 
Murang’a district dummy -0.436 -1.17 
Narok district dummy 11.019 2.04** 
   
Error correction terms (residuals)   
Listened to extension services 0.168 0.87 
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Membership in income generating groups -0.725 -2.48*** 
Membership in loans generating groups 0.355 1.89** 
Membership in benevolent groups -0.384 -1.18 
Lagged value of livestock  1.081 7.33*** 
Constant 6.243 2.98*** 
Observations 454  
R-squared 0.6054  
F (44, 409) 13.54  
 
Robust t statistics in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
ply that tenure security is associated with more livestock 
wealth. The importance of tenure is confirmed by a test of 
joint significance which shows that tenure security varia-
bles are jointly significant at the 5% level.  Both presence 
and membership in village institutions are important 
correlates of livestock wealth. However, presence of 
men’s groups and village committees are inversely 
related to livestock wealth. The same result is found for 
membership in income generation groups. This could 
mean that these different groups provide members with 
other opportunities outside livestock production. However 
presence  of  income generation groups and membership 
in loans groups are positive and significant determinants 
of livestock wealth. 
The regression results for the three welfare models 
imply that farm, household and village characteristics 
(including development domain dimensions) are 
important determinants of household welfare and that the 
impact is more pronounced on livestock wealth than on 
incomes poverty. The results however suggest that 
targeting interventions for alleviating incomes poverty 
would also have an important on a livestock wealth.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the important of tenure security 
and investment in soil and water conservation strategies 
on household welfare using survey data from Kenya. The 
analysis is based on a sample survey of 457 households 
collected from 3 districts in Kenya in November and 
December, 2004. The key hypothesis tested in this paper 
is that investments in soil and water conservation affect 
household welfare. In analyzing this relationship, we also 
test the impact of household, farm and village 
characteristics including development domain dimensions 
that condition this link. We estimate simple reduced form 
models of household welfare (per capita expenditure and 
incomes) as in the literature but introduce tenure security; 
soil and water conservation variables into the welfare 
function. In addition, we estimate a reduced form model 
for livestock wealth as a proxy for asset based poverty. 
Factor analysis  is  used  to  derive  tenure  security  and   
other institutional variables for final input into the model. 
The results show that strong land rights are directly 
related to household welfare when welfare is measured 
through livestock wealth but not when measured through 
expenditures and incomes. The total number of conser-
vation structures in place is an important determinant of 
household welfare, implying a poverty-environment link. 
This link is also supported by the positive significant coef-
ficient of willingness to invest in SWC for livestock wealth. 
Our results further show that presence and membership 
in village institutions are important determinants of 
household welfare. However presence matters more for 
livestock wealth, while membership is more important for 
income measures of poverty. Farm characteristics are 
also important determinants of household welfare. In 
particular, our results show that variables related to soil 
quality and topography are important determinants of 
household welfare. Since these variables are directly 
linked to the environmental status and agro ecological 
potential of land, their impact on welfare also supports 
the existence of the poverty-environment link. Results for 
district dummies suggest existence of district specific 
direct and indirect effects on household welfare and 
therefore suggest unobserved heterogeneity in deter-
minants of welfare. These results also show that among 
other factors, the poverty-environment link is conditioned 
by the agro-ecological potential. Household charac-
teristics point at the importance of family composition and 
size as well as family cycle effects on welfare. 
We conclude that development domain dimensions 
together with other farm, household and village charac-
teristics are important correlates of household welfare 
and that their impact is more pronounced on livestock 
wealth than on incomes poverty. The results suggest that 
targeting interventions for alleviating incomes poverty 
would also have an important impact on livestock wealth. 
Endeavors that improve development domains are urgent  
  
 
 
in the fight against poverty in Kenya. 
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